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Naked and Afraid? Vulnerabilities in the Electricity
Infrastructure and Criminal Law
INTRODUCTION
It is April 12, 2018. Dozens of terrorists just attacked the United States
in a conspiracy to launch a cyberattack on the power grid. Cities around
the country lose electricity immediately. Utility providers and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) respond quickly, but the
terrorists have also physically attacked the backup transformers and cut off
power lines essential for restoring electricity. A third of the United States is
without power and will be for weeks, causing great inconvenience, billions
of dollars in damage, and—in some cases—serious bodily injury or death.
Americans depend on electricity culturally, economically, and politically.
Without electricity, it would be impossible to charge cell phones and computers;
receive news or get on the Internet; pump gas, preserve food, access clean water,
heat homes; or retrieve money. Doctors would be powerless to keep many of
their hospital patients alive, and the military would be unable to coordinate
strategy or communicate. The effects of electricity loss would be apocalyptic.
This scenario is not farfetched; an attack on the United States’ electricity
infrastructure could really happen. If it did happen, the federal government
is ill-equipped, both to restore the grid and to prosecute the terrorists.
Unfortunately, Americans have had enough experience with terrorism
to have learned how not to address the issue. The first step to addressing a
national security risk must be to debate the character of the problem.1 The
problem is that the United States’ electricity grid is old and haphazardly
patched together; as a result, it is extremely vulnerable to attack.2
The U.S. electricity grid is in the initial stages of transformation to a
Smart Grid, which will take twenty-five to thirty years.3 One purpose of this
transformation is to improve security.4 More specifically, the government’s
goal is to make the electrical system resistant to natural disasters and various
forms of attack.
Copyright 2018, by MELISSA WHEELER.
1. Richard Danzig, Foreword to ANDREAS WEGNER & RETO WOLLENMANN,
BIOTERRORISM: CONFRONTING A COMPLEX THREAT, at vii (2008).
2. GRETCHEN BAKKE, GRID: THE FRAYING WIRES BETWEEN AMERICANS
AND OUR ENERGY FUTURE, at xiv (2016).
3. The Future of the Grid, SMARTGRID, https://perma.cc/AN23-RMB9 (last
visited Jan. 21, 2017).
4. See What is the Smart Grid?, SMARTGRID, https://perma.cc/J3GP-NPNA
(last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
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While energy sector actors are trying to identify vulnerabilities in the
current grid, the legal system has yet to respond to the evolution or the
risks of the infrastructure.
The legal regime criminalizing terrorism must evolve with the electricity
infrastructure to anticipate sophisticated terrorist threats. Preparation is
essential to national security; according to the U.S. Department of Justice,
prevention of terrorism and promotion of the nation’s security consistent
with the rule of law is an essential strategic goal.5 This goal will be
impossible to accomplish until there are sufficient laws on the subject.6
There are no federal criminal laws that condemn cyberattacks against
electricity-utilities’ computer systems or the physical attacks a terrorist
might perpetrate. Even on an international scale, the failure of nationstates to create a single definition of terrorism leaves electric grids and
millions of people unprotected. There must be a comprehensive legal
framework to simplify the prosecution of terrorists and protect citizens
from long-term blackouts.
This article will emphasize the importance of preparedness as a means to
enhancing national security and promoting peace of mind. Part I will explain
how the electricity infrastructure works and further, will describe the proposed
Smart Grid. Part II will explain how the grid is vulnerable to both physical
and cyber terrorist attacks. Part III will explain shortcomings in both
international and domestic anti-terrorist law. Part IV will propose solutions
for how the criminal justice system can adequately address an attack.
I. THE ELECTRIC GRID
A. History of the Grid
Electricity is a fundamental part of American life and therefore
essential to national security. Knowing the history of the grid is crucial to
understanding its current design, vulnerabilities, and the industry’s need
to upgrade to the Smart Grid. The grid exists in its current form for two

5. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
2014-2018 STRATEGIC PLAN 13 (2012) [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN].
6. An attack on electricity infrastructure may not seem as dramatic as an
attack on nuclear structure or bioterrorism. While romanticizing the tragic end of
our democracy is a fascinating pastime, risks of both nuclear and biological
attacks are explored extensively in scholarly literature and are specifically
addressed in our laws. Attacks on electricity infrastructure are not specifically
addressed. See generally CHARLES FERGUSON ET AL., THE FOUR FACES OF
NUCLEAR TERRORISM (2005); WEGNER & WOLLENMANN, supra note 1.
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reasons: (1) the nature of electricity and (2) the methods that its discoverers
used to make electricity accessibility cheaper for the general public.
The electric grid is a power delivery system.7 Researchers first explored
the nature of electricity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.8 Because
magnetic movement of electrons—electricity—is instantaneous, electricity
must be consumed the moment it is produced and before it converts to heat
energy.9 Researchers found that an efficient electric system requires a
connected grid of wires to carry electricity straight from its generation to
its use.10
After thinking about how to make electricity accessible and affordable,
scientists concluded that generators would need to be connected to many
users at once.11 Therefore, they built grids to maximize the scale of the
operation at a minimal cost.12
The resulting technological advances in generation and transmission
quickly led to the aggregation of small companies into larger monopolies
over U.S. regions.13 The first electricity supply systems were private and
unregulated.14 Utility companies made bilateral and multilateral agreements
to pool power; over decades, economies of scale15 and technological
advancement led to very large power markets and huge interconnected
regions sharing electricity.16
Today, these power markets are so large that the United States has a
total of only three of them.17 One grid provides electricity for the West, a bit
of Mexico, and much of western Canada; the second for all of the East; and
the third for Texas exclusively.18 Through these grids, energy is generated
from many power sources, sent through power lines to substations and

7. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, TERRORISM & THE
ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM 21 (2012).
8. History of Electricity, INST. FOR ENERGY RES., https://perma.cc/9YQ75M9Z (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. TERRORISM & THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 7.
14. Id. at 20.
15. Economies of scale arise when average costs decline with the increasing
size of a unit. See generally Raymond Hartman, The Efficiency Effects of Electric
Utility Mergers: Lessons from Statistical Cost Analysis, 17 ENERGY L.J. 425 (1996).
16. Id.
17. BAKKE, supra note 2.
18. Id. Texas chooses to manage its entire electricity infrastructure independently.
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transformers, distributed by utility companies, and finally consumed by
the public.19
The private sector owns more than eighty percent of the electricity
infrastructure system;20 this system contains approximately 6,413 power
plants.21 From those power plants, more than 200,000 miles of power lines
transfer electricity to almost all of the 318 million people in the United
States.22 As a whole, the United States’ electric power industry includes over
3,000 businesses, institutions, and regulatory bodies.23 All of these actors
must cooperate for the system to function. An attack on this infrastructure
has the potential to affect every single actor, from plants to individuals.
B. The Innovations of the Smart Grid
Currently, electricity infrastructure is going through extensive changes
to become a “Smart Grid.” The Smart Grid is: “[t]he integration and
application of real-time monitoring, advanced sensing, communications,
analytics, and control, enabling the dynamic flow of both energy and
information to accommodate existing and new forms of supply, delivery,
and use in a secure, reliable, and efficient electric power system, from
generation source to end-user.”24
The principal purpose of the Smart Grid is to update the electricity
infrastructure because the grid has aged quickly and has not been
significantly redesigned since it was originally implemented.25 Over seventy
percent of transformers and transmission lines are twenty-five years old;
power plants, on average, are thirty-four years old.26 The age of the
infrastructure has personal and economic costs because as the grid ages, it
is more likely to break down, which causes intermittent power outages.
Every year, both the number of power outages and the length of time
power outages last continue to increase in direct correlation to the age of
the infrastructure.27 In most industrialized countries, blackouts last less
19. Sarah Gerrity & Allison Lantero, Infographic: Understanding the Grid,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Nov. 17, 2014, 2:05 PM), https://perma.cc/6FJE-DF4C.
20. Energy Sector, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://perma.cc/APN5-L6NE
(last updated July 11, 2017).
21. Id.
22. TERRORISM & THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 7.
23. Id. at 23.
24. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., RELIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FROM
THE INTEGRATION OF THE SMART GRID 96 (2010), https://perma.cc/VRF6-2DLH.
25. Mark Chediack et al., Crumbling U.S. Grid Gets Jolt Driving Smart
Houston Power, BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2014), https://perma.cc/R3AP-PLJ7.
26. BAKKE, supra note 2.
27. Id.
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than ten minutes, but in the United States the average outage is 120
minutes.28 Outages cost the country over $188 billion annually.29 Ideally,
once upgraded, the Smart Grid will facilitate more efficient transmission
of electricity, quicker restoration of electricity after disturbances, reduced
peak demand, reduced operations and management costs for utilities,
increased integration of renewable energy systems, increased integration
of customer-owner power generation, and improved security.30 The four
main updates intended to make the grid “smarter” are: (1) Distribution
Intelligence, (2) batteries, (3) microgrids, and (4) smart meters.
First, Distribution Intelligence is a “self-healing” system designed to
detect power outages and immediately respond to reroute energy around
the outage.31 Distribution Intelligence is meant to pinpoint the source of
the problem in transmission lines on its own.32 This system will
incorporate fully automated rerouting of electricity when an outage occurs.
Second, the electricity industry has also been working on developing
new and stronger batteries. New energy storage technology helps to
integrate renewable energy into the power grid by managing the supply of
energy.33 Scientists built the power grid to transmit a consistent flow of
energy from generation to consumption.34 Yet, renewable energy, such as
solar and wind power, is not generated in consistent amounts. Batteries
alleviate this problem because they can collect and store energy until it is
needed, allowing electricity to flow through the grid consistently.
Third, microgrids are designed to protect the electric grid. If a
disruption or outage on the grid occurs, microgrids can disconnect from
the larger grid and function as an electrical island.35 Isolation of critical
systems is essential to increasing the security of the grid because
interconnection puts the entire system, rather than just individual parts, at
risk.36
Lastly, smart meters are the parts of the grid that most directly impact
the consumer. They facilitate communication between consumers and utility
companies regarding energy use and notify utility companies immediately

28. Id.
29. Improving Grid Reliability, TOLLGRADE, https://perma.cc/QX6X-ULP2
(last visited Nov. 6, 2017).
30. What is the Smart Grid?, supra note 4.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Gerrity & Lantero, supra note 19.
34. BAKKE, supra note 2, at xvi.
35. Gerrity & Lantero, supra note 19.
36. TERRORISM & THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 44.
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when the power goes out.37 In 2014, 58.5 million smart meters were installed;
about eighty-eight percent of them were residential.38 Even though smart
meters are currently being implemented, their benefits will not be realized
anytime soon.
The industry has commenced implementation of the Smart Grid, but the
upgrades will not be complete for decades.39 Until then, America’s system
will be vulnerable to traditional forms of attack. Although transformation
will take time and investment, having a “strong,” or resilient, grid is just as
important as having a “smart” grid.40 The industry should move forward
with changes that will truly improve security as citizens await the long-term
improvements in design.
II. THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE GRID TO A TERRORIST ATTACK
There is no evidence that the government is considering any new legal
approaches to terrorism in the realm of energy infrastructure.41 The threat is
not hypothetical. In 2013, the energy sector was the most targeted sector for
hackers in the United States, accounting for fifty-six percent of the 257
attacks reported to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.42 In 2015,
according to the U.S. State Department, there were 255 terrorist attacks
targeting utility companies worldwide, out of 12,204 terrorist attacks
total.43 This section considers the vulnerabilities of the electricity
infrastructure and risk of a terrorist attack in three parts: types of potential
terrorist attacks; the likelihood that the Smart Grid will improve security;
and the actual risk of an attack. Governments must consider all three issues
as they develop and refine anti-terrorism laws.

37. Gerrity & Lantero, supra note 19.
38. How Many Smart Meters are Installed in the United States and Who Has
Them?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/T6UJ-YEM5 (last visited Jan.
21, 2017).
39. The Future of the Grid, supra note 3.
40. Kennedy Maize, The Electric Grid: Civilization’s Achilles Heel?, POWER
MAGAZINE (Jan. 1, 2013), https://perma.cc/YPL7-G2DB.
41. Matthew L. Wald, Terrorist Attack on Power Grid Could Cause Broad
Hardship, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11
/15/science/earth/electric-industry-is-urged-to-gird-against-terrorist-attacks.html?_r=0.
42. Nicole Perlroth, Smart City Technology May Be Vulnerable to Hackers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2015, https://perma.cc/6K8N-2JK2.
43. NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO
TERRORISM, ANNEX OF STATISTICAL INFORMATION: COUNTRY REPORTS ON
TERRORISM 2015, 15 (2016).
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A. Types of Attacks on Electricity Infrastructure
The current electricity infrastructure was not designed to withstand
well-organized acts of terrorism aimed at key elements of the system.44
The grid is susceptible to two general types of attack: physical attack and
cyberattack.
Targets for physical attacks might include any equipment used in the
production or transmission of electricity.45 Much of the equipment is so
large that it must be located outdoors, where it is vulnerable to weapons
ranging from rifles to laser-guided missiles.46 Because electric energy
converts to heat, electricity equipment often operates at elevated temperatures.
The high temperatures make the equipment even more susceptible to heatseeking missiles or homemade bombs.47 Even a drone strike could harm much
of the outside equipment.48 Consider transmission towers that span thousands
of miles. An attack on transmission towers could happen without observation
in more remote parts of the nation.49 Transformers are other potential targets;
if lost, they would require replacing, which creates considerable revenue loss.
Large power transformers are challenging to replace because they are usually
custom-made and can cost between three and ten million dollars each.50
Notably, the power industry has not publicly disclosed the number of these
transformers; officials of the Department of Energy have stated that the
agency is not even aware of the official number.51 Finally, other physical
targets include the electric utility companies’ office buildings and warehouses.
The loss of computers controlling parts of the grid could be devastating for
many companies. Replacement of physical embodiments of the electricity
infrastructure after an attack would be costly for the utility companies
affected, the government, and the consumer.
A cyberattack target might include any components used to monitor
and control the production, transmission, and flow of electricity.52 An
actor would have to intrude into the control systems through the Internet
or the utility’s private networks. The interconnectedness of a benign social
44. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, MAKING THE NATION SAFER:
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING TERRORISM 177 (2002).
45. Id. at 181.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Drones: What Are They and How Do They Work?, BRITISH
BROADCASTING CHANNEL (Jan. 31, 2012).
49. MAKING THE NATION SAFER, supra note 44, at 181.
50. TED KOPPEL, LIGHTS OUT: A CYBERATTACK, A NATION UNPREPARED,
SURVIVING THE AFTERMATH 95 (2015).
51. Id.
52. MAKING THE NATION SAFER, supra note 44, at 181.
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network, like the Internet, can also provide countless paths of access for
an attacker.53 Cyberattacks are already common in the United States, but
one unique challenge to addressing them is that both the target of a
cyberattack and the attacker are disinclined to make the attack known for
privacy or public relations reasons.54
Computerization of the electric industry makes it more vulnerable to
cyberattack because companies rely on information management and
computer systems. Computerization has reduced the need for personnel at
key facilities such as electric substations and congested transmission
corridors and has increased reliance on unsecured telecommunications or
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.55 SCADA
systems allow automatic remote access to utilities and are designed to
increase functionality rather than security.56 Because of their connection to
the Internet, SCADA systems are extremely susceptible to cyber-intrusion.57
The use of simple technologies such as firewalls, encryption techniques, and
surveillance technologies can help protect these systems. The issue with
these technologies is that they are not designed to block and identify
breaches as quickly as the rest of the SCADA systems operate.58
Another threat to the electric grid is an electromagnetic pulse attack
(EMP). Similar to a cyberattack, an EMP would involve the introduction
of radio or micro frequency waves into the circuits of the control systems,
upsetting the electronics and leading to network destabilization and
outages.59 This type of attack might not lead to a need to replace equipment,
but an attack of this sort could affect enormous portions of the grid.60 Cyber
and electromagnetic attacks are possible due to the multiple points of entry
into systems and the number of Internet experts with the ability to perpetrate
an attack.
Since both physical and cyberattacks, on their own, could cause
extensive damage, a terrorist attack combining them would certainly ensure
a blackout. Measuring the cost of large-scale or long-duration blackouts is
not easy. After the August 2003 blackout that struck the Midwest, the
Northeast, and parts of Canada, the estimated final cost was six billion

53. KOPPEL, supra note 50, at 63.
54. Id. at 9.
55. MAKING THE NATION SAFER, supra note 44, at 178.
56. Jennifer Alvey, Digital Terrorism: Holes in the Firewall?, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., March 2002, at 12, 14.
57. Id. at 13.
58. Id. at 17.
59. MAKING THE NATION SAFER, supra note 44, at 182.
60. Id.
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dollars.61 That blackout was not intentional—the combination of a
computer bug and an overgrown tree caused fifty million people to lose
power for two days.62 One projection from the National Research Council,
based on a theoretical 2005 blackout of New Jersey Utility Public Service
Electric & Gas found that a ninety-five percent loss of power in one day,
and restoration of ten percent power after two months, would result in a
loss of $389 billion for that state.63 Disruption from an intentional attack
could cost the country billions of dollars. If large and extended outages
occurred during severe weather, hundreds of people could die from
exposure to extreme heat or cold.64 An isolated assault on an individual
station, substation, or control center could cause a local disruption. A
coordinated attack on multiple points in the system could potentially lead
to a multistate blackout. Power would be restored in days or weeks at best,
but acute shortages could result in rolling blackouts for years.65 Cascading
failure is when the collapse of a system in one spot sets off a chain of
failures. This occurred in the August 2003 blackout; the power failure
spread from Detroit to New York in just a few moments.66 The enormity
of target possibilities that could cause such a widespread blackout
necessitates legal protection.
B. The Smart Grid and Resiliency in Case of Attack
Ideally, the implementation of the Smart Grid will decrease the
vulnerability of the infrastructure to terrorist attacks. There are five main
challenges to security that should be addressed as the industry updates the
grid: (1) the large amount of consumer information the grid will transmit,
(2) the greater number of control devices in the Smart Grid, (3) the poor
physical security of a great portion of these devices, (4) the use of Internet
Protocol as a communication standard, and (5) the greater number of
stakeholders the grid will rely on for its smooth operation.67 According to
a European study of the first steps of implementation of a Smart Grid, the
61. TERRORISM & THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 16.
62. BAKKE, supra note 2, at xv.
63. TERRORISM & THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 16.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 180-81.
66. Matthew L. Wald, As Worries Over the Power Grid Rise, a Drill Will
Simulate a Knockout Blow, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/08/17/us/as-worries-over-the-power-grid-rise-a-drill-will-simulate-a-knockout
-blow.html?_r=0.
67. VINCENZO GIORDANO ET AL., EUR. COMM’N, SMART GRID PROJECTS IN
EUROPE: LESSONS LEARNED & CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 56 (2013).

514

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. VI

information technology concept of “defense in depth”68 must be applied to
a Smart Grid system to keep it secure—especially for SCADA systems—
even if protections become redundant.69
A loss of control over utilities’ control system communications would
be disastrous. An inability to open and close circuit breakers, load signals
to generators, or communicate with adjacent organizations would reduce
the utility of the Smart Grid. The result would be a large-scale power
outage and likely a slow recovery.70 Losing telemetry to individual devices
or losing the ability to communicate with individual devices is fairly
frequent and inconsequential; introduction of smart meters would mitigate
this issue.71 An inability to communicate between SCADA and regional
systems would be detrimental to real-time data exchange. Communication
within the Smart Grid is essential to prevent cascading failure;72 loss of
control of the grid would lead to unreliable operation and possibly a
blackout.73
Although the Smart Grid has many benefits, the more electronic,
sophisticated, and “smart”—or computer assisted—the system becomes,
the more vulnerable it is to code hacking.74 Three of the main vulnerabilities
are: inadequately secured wireless communication, use of a non-dedicated
communications channel for command and control, and unauthenticated
command and control data.75 One of the safest ways to protect the grid is
to split it into “islands;” the less interconnected the grid is, the fewer the
number of people that will be affected by an attack.76 Once implemented,
the microgrid innovation would address and solve this issue.
In its final state, a Smart Grid might prevent cascading blackouts with
quick identification of failures in the grid and isolation of the issue, but the
transition will take time. Smart meters enable utility companies to
immediately recognize when the power goes off. Most disturbances happen

68. “Defense in depth” is a strategy for mitigating cybersecurity threats.
“Defense in depth” works by creating layers of protection to catch attacks. See
generally Trevor Ford, Cybersecurity Legislation for an Evolving World, 50
U.S.F. L. REV. 119 (2016).
69. GIORDANO ET AL., supra note 67 at 57.
70. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 24, at 78.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Maize, supra note 40.
75. TERRORISM & THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 45.
76. Maize, supra note 40.
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earlier in the electricity distribution system, however, rather than at a
consuming building.77
The grid is similarly vulnerable to an inside attack. Insiders have the
knowledge and access to damage physical aspects such as transformers
and switchgear. Employees with access to the utility company’s software
could insert viruses or change programs to wreak havoc on control
systems.78 Background checks are essential and may be one of the few
ways to prevent an attack. The system is hard to regulate because so many
actors oversee its maintenance and protection, and each is becoming more
dependent on computers.79 Many companies are pouring money into
updating their infrastructure, but the ones who do not update will be the
weakest links.80
Other actors in the electricity and energy sectors are putting effort into
improving security. Batteries are still an important innovation; as companies
design and develop new energy storage mechanisms, they will also need to
be protected from attack. Some companies are working on bulletproof
transformers.81 Transformers are an essential part of all power transmission
networks and must be protected from external damage, including from
firearms, the ownership of which is permitted in many jurisdictions in the
United States.
For example, an attack on transformers occurred on April 16, 2013, in
San José, California, where snipers knocked out seventeen transformers in
twenty minutes.82 Restoration cost about $15.4 million.83 Such events
underscore the necessity of developing bulletproof transformers.
The issue with both batteries and transformers is that they are physical
embodiments of the grid and are therefore subject to physical attack. For
cyberattack protection, one company, the Edison Electric Institute, has
been working on a program called the Cyber Risk Information Sharing
Program (CRISP).84 CRISP’s purpose is to help share real-time data, but

77. Diane Cardwell, Grid Sensors Could Ease Disruptions of Power, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/business/energy-environ
ment/smart-sensors-for-power-grid-could-ease-disruptions.html.
78. TERRORISM & THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 48.
79. KOPPEL, supra note 50, at 28.
80. Id.
81. SIEMENS, TRANSFORMING FUTURE TRENDS INTO INNOVATIONS: SIEMENS
BULLETPROOF TRANSFORMERS & REACTORS (2014), https://perma.cc/2N9P-HU8J.
82. Id.
83. Petter Fiskerud, Grid Resilience: Come Hell or High Water,
ELECTROINDUSTRY, Sept. 2016, at 11, https://perma.cc/6MM9-67TE.
84. KOPPEL, supra note 50, at 48.
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the data focuses on amounts of traffic and identifying IP addresses or
malware.85 The project is still in its infancy.86
Some actors in the electricity industry have been participating in drills to
prepare for security breaches and test grid security. GridEx, or Grid Exercises,
are emergency drills organized by utilities and government agencies in
Canada, the U.S., and Mexico to simulate physical attacks and cyberattacks
that could take down large sections of the grid.87 Of course, as detrimental to
the civilian population as an attack might be, the electric power industry has
a greater interest in protecting itself; security efforts are complicated by the
necessity of profiting and staying in business.88 While some government
actors say the industry has a conflict of interest, some actors in the energy and
electricity industry say that the government does not know enough about the
science behind the grid.89 Either way, GridEx is a commendable team effort
that should be continued.
The biggest issue with the current infrastructure is that there are a limited
number of alternative paths that an electric current can take. Destruction of one
cable could knock out power to a remote town. It would be simple for terrorists
to short circuit cables, forcing a shutdown of supply to a main or local
substation. Even if electricity was quickly rerouted, any immediate attacks on
transformers further down the lines could cause new failures even when power
is returned.90 Very little risk exists for the attacker of electric power transmission
and distribution systems, especially if there is only a cyberattack.91
The updates the Smart Grid is intended to provide are necessary because of
the increased age of the infrastructure, which creates safety risks and economic
inefficiencies. Although computerization will always leave every computer and
program at risk, instant identification of issues through Distribution Intelligence
and smart meters as well as instant restriction of a blackout from spreading
through microgrids are the best ways a cascading blackout can be prevented.
Insofar as the Smart Grid blocks alternative paths for a blackout to spread and
creates alternative paths for electric current, it can increase grid security. As the
National Research Council suggests in a 2012 report:
Even if all reasonable steps are taken to ensure the reliability of the
electric power transmission and distribution system, and to speed
its rapid restoration after outages, there is no way that it can be made
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Wald, supra note 66.
KOPPEL, supra note 50, at 45.
Id.
MICHAEL O’CONNOR, TERRORISM ... THE SOLUTIONS 62 (1987).
TERRORISM & THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 32.
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completely reliable in the face of major disruption by natural causes
or large, well-planned terrorist attacks. For this reason, and because
modern society is increasingly dependent on electric power for the
provision of critical social services, steps should be taken to ensure
that the most important of these services can continue to be
sustained if power from the grid is not available.92
Preparation is an imperative response to the risk of an attack perceived by
the industry.
III. TERRORISM IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
A survey of both international and national law reveals that legal
systems are unprepared to handle many types of terrorist threats, especially
those on electricity infrastructure. Although discussion of terrorism
permeates the news and the American psyche, laws on terrorism do not seem
to be promulgated until after something goes wrong. If an attack took place
and there were no legal remedy for victims, terrorists would accomplish all
of their goals: spreading fear and provoking reactive policies through
psychological warfare.93 The international community must continue to
consider and discuss different legal approaches to the threat of terrorism and
the best methods by which to prevent and punish it. This consideration and
discussion should focus on three issues: (1) the nature of terrorism, (2)
typical terrorist tactics, and (3) the reasons why people engage in terrorism
to accomplish their goals.
Terrorism is the systematic application of terror.94 More specifically, it
is the “use or repeated threat of violence, in support of or in opposition to
some authority, where violence is employed to induce fear or similar attack
in as many non-immediate victims as possible so that those so threatened
will accept and comply with the demands of terrorists.”95 Attacks usually
provoke increased security measures, which lead to a reduction in civil
liberties, and “thus the people will be turned against their leaders.”96
Reactionary decision-making limiting citizens’ rights, especially in the form
of law, is evidence of terrorists justifying their resort to the use of fearinducing tactics.
Although methods may vary, typical terrorist tactics have several
common features, including: (1) the use of violence to persuade; (2)
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 89-90.
JESSICA STERN & J.M. BERGER, ISIS: THE STATE OF TERROR 199 (2015).
O’CONNOR, supra note 90, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 10-11.
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selection of targets and victims for maximum propaganda value; (3) the use
of unprovoked attacks; (4) maximum publicity at minimum risk; (5) use of
surprise to circumvent countermeasures; (6) threats, harassment, and
violence; (7) disregarding women and children as victims; (8) propaganda
to maximize the effect; or (9) loyalty only to themselves and kindred
groups.97 Most terrorists aim for publicity over sympathy; an act as simple
as kidnapping and issuing a statement can bring worldwide attention to a
cause.98 Indiscriminate, or preferably—for the terrorists—unpredictable,
attacks will ensure a worldwide reaction.
People engage in terrorism for many reasons, for terrorism is a product
of individual convictions as well as culture. Defining terrorism and
providing legal consequences for it is important, but what some call
terrorism could also be the product of another’s singular and exclusive
understanding of the world.99 The most important lesson from recognizing
the individualism of terrorism is that no single discipline or approach will
ever eliminate violence.100 Recognizing how someone chooses to embrace
terrorist tendencies is as important to crime prevention as building
infrastructure.
Electricity infrastructure is an advantageous target for terrorists
because of the violent effects (some people may die immediately, others
may die in the following weeks or months due to weather or starvation),
the propaganda value, and the lack of risk to perpetrators in physical
attacks and especially cyberattacks.101 There should be laws criminalizing
these types of terrorist attacks, but none exist.
A. Indecisiveness in International Law
One reason for the absence of laws criminalizing these attacks is that
international legal scholars and bodies have been unable to agree on a
general legal definition for terrorism. In 1937, the League of Nations
adopted a treaty requiring nation-states to criminalize acts of terrorism under
their own laws, which was the first modern attempt to codify the crime of
terrorism in international law.102
97. FRANK BOLZ JR. ET AL., THE COUNTER-TERRORISM HANDBOOK:
TACTICS, PROCEDURES, AND TECHNIQUES 4-6 (2011).
98. Id. at 8.
99. MICHAEL P. ARENA & BRUCE A. ARRIGO, THE TERRORIST IDENTITY:
EXPLAINING THE TERRORIST THREAT 20-21 (2006).
100. Id.
101. TERRORISM & THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 15.
102. BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW & ITS ENFORCEMENT 662 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2015).
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International Conventions for the Suppression of Financing of
Terrorism were held in 1998 and 1999. They did not define terrorism
explicitly, but they asked states to criminalize any activity that violated
certain treaties, caused death or serious bodily injury, or attempted or
conspired to commit an act of terrorism.103
The United Nations General Assembly, in Resolution 51–201 of 1999,
said, “Criminal Acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror . . .
are in any circumstance unjustifiable,” which is a very broad condemnation.104
States struggle to agree on a definition for several reasons: (1) they reject
definitions that are redundant—that is, overlap with war crimes or crimes
against humanity; (2) some of them reject definitions that arguably include
their own particular behavior; and (3) some reject definitions that do not
include what they consider to be terrorist acts by their enemies.
The International Convention for Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
of 1998 provides an actual definition of terrorism:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this
convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers,
places, discharges, or detonates an explosive or other lethal device
in, into or against a place of public use, a state or government
facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure
facility: (I) with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury,
(II) with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place,
facility or system, where such destruction results in or is likely to
result in major economic loss.105
A definition that mentions infrastructure, such as this one, directly protects
part of the electricity infrastructure as well as other types of energy. This
definition, however, exclusively focuses on bombing for the method of
attack. A terrorist might attack electrical infrastructure in other ways. One
can also find definitions for terrorism in the Convention of the Islamic
Conference on Combating International Terrorism (1999), which does not
mention infrastructure, and the Organization of African Unity Convention
on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which mentions only
disrupting public services.106
The closest the international community has come to a consensus was
in the United Nations’ Draft Comprehensive Convention Against
103. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism art. II, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197.
104. SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 102, at 664.
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 665.
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International Terrorism. This convention includes infrastructure in its
definition of terrorism, last updated in 2002:
Any person commits an offense within the meaning of the present
Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and
intentionally, causes: (a) Death or serious bodily injury, (b)
Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of
public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation
system, an infrastructure facility or to the environment; or (c)
damage to such property, places, facilities or systems resulting in
or likely to result in major economic loss; When the purpose of
the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population,
or to compel a government or an international organization to do
or to abstain from doing any act.107
States have heavily debated this definition without ever coming to a
solution. The main issue is to whom this definition would apply and when
it would apply, especially in cases of armed conflict. To this day, no
international consensus exists about what constitutes the optimal legal
definition of terrorism.
Other components of the international system that could provide
protection for attacks on electricity infrastructure without a consensus on the
definition of terrorism include international organizations, international
humanitarian law, and international criminal law.
One international organization with this power is the United Nations.
The United Nations Security Council has proposed several resolutions on
terrorism, but they are extremely limited in scope—for example, one is
limited to plane hijackings. The first to address terrorism in general was
Resolution 1269 (1999);108 Resolution 1269 also urged states to implement
the terrorism conventions.109 Second, Resolution 1373, which was adopted
in September 2001,110 required states to enact criminal laws prohibiting
terrorism, especially the financing of terrorism.111 Third, Resolution 2178
(2014), which links violent extremism and terrorism, required member
states collectively to prevent radicalization and honor their agreements
107. Id. at 666.
108. Security Council ‘Unequivocally’ Condemns ISIL Terrorist Attacks,
Unanimously Adopting Text that Determines Extremist Group Poses
‘Unprecedented’ Threat, U.N. (Oct. 19, 1999), https://perma.cc/CX2U-HEK4.
109. Id.
110. Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism
Resolution; Calls for Suppressing Financing, Improving International
Cooperation, U.N. (Sept. 28, 2001), https://perma.cc/9SE7-PQQC.
111. Id.
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under international human rights law.112 Fourth, Resolution 2199 obligated
states to block the flow of profits from trade in oil, antiquities, and
hostages to Iraq and Syria.113 Lastly, Resolution 2253 (2015) reaffirms the
powers of the Security Council Committee Pursuant to [Resolutions]
Concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and Associated Individuals, Groups,
Undertakings, and Entities and reestablishes a freeze on assets, an arms
embargo, and a travel ban.114 None of these resolutions directly mentions
electricity infrastructure. Trade of oil and assets is a higher priority, possibly
because electricity infrastructure is seen as an internal consideration for
states. Even the Secretary General’s Plan of Action Preventing Violent
Extremism fails to mention infrastructure. The Plan lists the possible reasons
for extremist activities on state and individual levels and establishes
expectations for nations.115 Its only energy concern, however, is oil trade
among terrorist groups.116
Second, international humanitarian law can and should condemn
terrorist attacks on electricity infrastructure. The Geneva Conventions and
the Additional Protocols are codifications of international humanitarian
law, or the law of armed conflict; the four separate Geneva Conventions
were adopted in August 1949, Protocol I and II in 1977, and the third
Protocol in 2005.117 Whether the conventions apply to a given attack
depends on several factors: whether the terrorist is a state or non-state
actor, the extent of damage to property, and the effect on citizens. The
Geneva Conventions make several references to infrastructure, but none
clearly provide for a terrorist attack on it.
Each of the conventions has two important shared elements. First,
common to the four Geneva Conventions, is Article III, which provides
minimum standards of conduct for states in situations of non-international
armed conflicts.118 This article requires humane treatment of people taking
no active part in hostilities and prohibits murder, cruel treatment, taking
112. U.N. Secretary General, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, ¶
5, U.N. Doc. A/70/674 (Dec. 24, 2015).
113. Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2199 (2015), Security Council
Condemns Trade with Al-Qaida Associated Groups, Threatens Further Targeted
Sanctions, U.N. (Feb. 12, 2015), https://perma.cc/QA5N-FXKW.
114. United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs, U.N.,
https://perma.cc/AQ67-NF2X (last visited Nov. 6, 2017).
115. Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, supra note 112, at ¶ 8.
116. Id. ¶¶ 14, 44.
117. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols, INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Jan. 1, 2014), https://perma.cc/W4D9-2AQD.
118. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.C.
3224, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
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hostages, and more.119 These requirements and prohibitions are important
because many armed conflicts today are not international. Noninternational armed conflict is a conflict not between two or more high
contracting parties to the convention, including conflicts internal to
states.120 Usually, terrorists are not state actors, so Article III could apply.
Second, these four Geneva Conventions also define “grave breaches” of
humanitarian law, which are the most egregious violations.121 The Fourth
Geneva Convention—which is most relevant to the discussion of
infrastructure because it focuses on civilians—lists “taking of hostages
and extensive destruction or appropriation of property” as a grave
breach.122 A terrorist attack that destroyed electricity infrastructure could
possibly qualify as a grave breach. This provision is the only one of the
four conventions that could possibly apply.
Protocol I expands the list of grave breaches. The most relevant
addition for the purposes of electricity security is Article 85(3)(c):
“launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous
forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life,
injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects.”123 This definition seems
to include many types of infrastructure. Depending on the circumstances,
a physical attack on some power plants might very well qualify. Similarly,
Article 56 prohibits attacks on “[w]orks or installations containing
dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating
stations . . . if such an attack may cause the release of dangerous forces
and consequent severe losses among the civilian population,” with an
exception for nuclear electricity generation stations that provide
significant support for military operations.124 This provision would protect
the generation components of the electric grid, but because it requires the
works or installations to contain dangerous forces and for the attack to
have the potential to release dangerous forces, the provision is very limited
in scope.

119. Id.
120. See David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the
Humanitarian Law of War and Occupation, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 295, 303 (2007).
121. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 147, Aug, 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
122. Id.
123. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 85,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
124. Id. art. 56.
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Protocol II expands on Common Article III by adding to the list of
prohibited acts in non-international conflicts.125 For the purposes of
electricity infrastructure, there are three important additions. First, Article
13(2) provides that “the civilian population as such, as well as individual
civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian
population are prohibited.”126 This is a direct prohibition of terrorism.
Second, Article 14 prohibits “starvation of citizens as a method of combat”
which is a possible outcome of an attack on electricity infrastructure
depending on the areas affected and the amount of time a blackout lasts.127
Too many factors influence the application of that provision. Third, Article
14 prohibits destruction of “objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population.”128 The provision lists “foodstuffs, crops, livestock,
drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works” as
examples of objects indispensable to survival.129 Electricity is not listed.
The necessity of water infrastructure is comparable to the necessity of
electricity infrastructure, suggesting that an analogy should be made to
extend the protection.
Given these provisions, the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocols can be interpreted to include a terrorist attack on energy
infrastructure. Still, this interpretation requires some skillful argumentation.
Third, international criminal law could provide protection for attacks
on electricity infrastructure without a consensus on the definition of
terrorism. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court creates
individual criminal liability rather than state liability.130 It came into effect
in 2002 and has jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.131 Under the Rome
Statute, a terrorist attack on electricity infrastructure would be most likely
to qualify as either a crime against humanity or a war crime. A crime
against humanity is an act “committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge
of the attack” that falls within the provided list or is similarly inhumane,
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical

125. Id. art. 1.
126. Id. art. 13 (emphasis added).
127. Id. art. 1.
128. Id. art. 14.
129. Id.
130. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
131. Id. art. 5.
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health.132 An attack on electricity infrastructure would probably not fall
into the enumerated list of crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute
but possibly could fall into the “other inhumane acts” category. Such an
attack, if carefully planned, could cause great suffering, but it must rise to
the standard of attacking human dignity with great humiliation or
degradation to fall into this category.
An attack might qualify as a war crime under Article 8 of the Rome
Statute. All grave breaches under the 1949 Geneva Conventions qualify as
war crimes, namely, “extensive destruction and appropriation of property,
not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly.”133 Infrastructure that qualifies as private property—which is
the majority of electricity infrastructure in the United States—should fall
under this definition. Other war crime provisions that might include attacks
on infrastructure include: “intentionally directing attacks against civilian
objects,” “destroying or seizing the enemy’s property,” and “intentionally
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental
loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects.”134 These
enumerations seem to address the terrorist attack method in question.135
There is no precedent to say a cyberattack on infrastructure would qualify
as an attack on a civilian object, but the provisions might cover some
physical attacks.
Finally, “intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of
warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable [sic] to survival” is a
war crime, as previously discussed regarding Protocol II.136 For many
Americans, deprivation of electricity could certainly lead to starvation—
but this argument is weak.
The first issue with using war crimes to charge alleged terrorists under
international law is that they are not state actors, and technically could not
declare war. Article 8(e), however, extends many of these provisions to
armed conflicts not of an international character, similar to Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.137
132. Id. art. 7.
133. Id. art. 8.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. As an example: The international community does not recognize ISIL
(Da’esh) as a state. If any members were charged in the ICC for their actions, they
might argue that they did not commit war crimes because they were refused statehood
status. However, if an actor is operating as if it is a state, maybe the ICC should hold
it accountable as states would be. Hopefully, Protocol II and Art. 8(e) of the Rome
Statute can be construed to hold these people accountable for their actions.
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The second issue is that the Rome Statute does not directly address
terrorism; terrorism is not its own offense. While acts of terrorism might
occur during a war, not all of them do.138 In cases where classifying
terrorism as a crime against humanity rather than a war crime would be
preferable, the “other” category does not satisfy the need to address the
condemnable acts. International criminal law would ideally be a remedy for
prosecution of terrorists, but International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutors
might struggle to squeeze an attack on electricity infrastructure into the
ICC’s narrow definitions of crimes.
Terrorists, as non-state actors, may not hold themselves to the standards
or principles of international organizations, international humanitarian law,
or international criminal law, so no limit exists to the atrocities they could
commit against citizens. International politics in the post-Cold War period
are characterized by an unprecedented fluidity, where it’s unclear who can
do what to whom and with what means they can do it.139 The Westphalian
system—a political scheme that recognized the nation-state as the exclusive
sovereign actor—has transformed, so that it is almost impossible not to
recognize the plurality of actors.140 Unrestrained by borders in the way that
states are, terrorist actors can recruit and perpetrate crimes around the world.
The concept of conventional warfare is not as relevant in the twenty-first
century due to the diffusion of modern technology.141 Terrorists have
influence in international politics because they use violence to create,
rather than express, identity.142 The law must explicitly condemn those
possible atrocities.
B. Failures in Federal Criminal Law and Energy Policy
If either a physical or cyberattack on electricity infrastructure
occurred, federal criminal law would not provide an explicit remedy in
138. Aviv Cohen, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court:
Reevaluating an Unused Legal Tool to Combat Terrorism, 20 MICH. ST. INT’L L.
REV. 219, 249 (2012).
139. PETER CHALK, NON-MILITARY SECURITY & GLOBAL ORDER: THE
IMPACT OF EXTREMISM, VIOLENCE,& CHAOS ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY 1 (2000).
140. The Westphalian theory of international relations suggests that since the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a Eurocentric bias has dominated politics and the
formation of states. See generally Turan Kayaglu, Westphalian Eurocentrism in
International Relations Theory, 12 INT’L STUDIES REV. 193 (2010).
141. This is even true for the United States: Congress has not officially
declared war since World War II. Official Declarations of War by Congress, U.S.
SENATE, https://perma.cc/ZZ5Y-A2QS (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
142. ARENA & ARRIGO, supra note 99.
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most situations. Four statutes in the section on terrorism might implicate
an attack on infrastructure. First, 18 U.S.C. § 2332b criminalizes terrorist
attacks from foreign sources.143 This statute never directly references
electricity infrastructure, but it does criminalize the destruction of property.
Any terrorist attack on infrastructure from a domestic source could not be
prosecuted under this statute.
Second, 18 U.S.C. § 2332f criminalizes bombings of infrastructure
facilities if the actor intends to cause death or serious bodily injury or
“inten[ds] to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility, or system,
where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic
loss.”144 This statute only applies to bombings, however, and does not extend
to any other kind of physical attack, including cyberattacks.
Third, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B establishes the crime of providing material
support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization.145 “Material
support or resources” means providing to a terrorist “any property . . . financial
services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false
documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities,
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel . . . and transportation.”146
Material support prosecutions do not require an act of terrorism, as the statute
criminalizes both attempt and conspiracy, so they have been essential to post9/11 strategies of preventive prosecutions.147 If a terrorist is not working with
a designated foreign terrorist organization, the provisions will not apply.
Fourth, alternatively or in conjunction with criminal liability, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(a) creates a civil action for persons, property, and businesses subject
to an act of international terrorism.148 Whether “international terrorism” in
this statute would include a situation where an American citizen plans an
attack in the United States for a foreign terrorist organization is unclear,
although that situation would qualify as material support. It would not
apply to an American national without ties to foreign terrorist groups.
The problem with these four statutes is that they are under-inclusive. They
exclude terrorists from the United States or terrorists that do not support a
specific organization. None of them contemplate a terrorist attack that does
not cause physical damage. A terrorist attack that causes physical damage
without a bomb would not fall under these statutes. Even worse, none of them
consider a cyberattack. Congress fails to acknowledge a basic concept of
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2015).
18 U.S.C. § 2332f(a)(1)(B) (2002).
18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2015).
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2009).
RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE:
PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 6 (2008).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2016).
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terrorism: anyone might desire to cause fear and influence the government.
With an infrastructure so widespread, intricate, and integral as the electric
grid, anyone with the right skills and intent to cause fear can succeed in an
attack. Terrorism is not limited to the organizations that the United States has
chosen to label. Clearly, American policy is to condemn terrorism, but no
statute is written in a way that provides sufficient actus reus for attacking
electricity infrastructure in the likely ways that a terrorist might.
It would be Congress’s responsibility to pass a statute regarding attacks;
Congress also plays an essential role in the recognition of issues with the
grid—whether efficiency or safety—and providing funding. In 2008, a
congressional commission first investigated the likelihood of an EMP
attack.149 The commission found that several states, including Russia, North
Korea, China, and Iran, were capable of perpetrating such an attack; some
terrorist organizations also had this ability.150 More recently, the Senate
committee of Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs considered
CIPA, or the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015.151 Its purpose is
to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to require the Department of
Homeland Security to assess the threat posed by EMPs and geomagnetic
disturbances (GMD) to infrastructure.152 Geomagnetic disturbances, like
EMPs, which occur naturally or with nuclear devices, could cause immediate
damage to the grid—at a minimum, some experts predict, twenty to forty
million people could lose power for two years.153 The Electromagnetic Pulse
Commission stated that the Department of Homeland Security has addressed
threats to the electric grid at large, but it is problematic that it has no statutory
obligation to address the commission’s recommendations.154 CIPA would
require the Department of Homeland Security to prepare a strategy to protect
infrastructure against EMP and GMD specifically. CIPA was introduced in
2013 and has not moved out of committee.155 A second piece of legislation,
the Secure High-Voltage Infrastructure for Electricity from Lethal Damage
Act, or SHIELD, was introduced the same year.156 Neither piece of legislation
has moved past their committees. It is doubtful that members of Congress
have suddenly found that an EMP attack is unlikely. Addressing the concerns
could cost a couple billion dollars, so the failure to pass legislation is most

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

ZABEL & BENJAMIN, JR., supra note 147.
Id. at 22.
S. REP. NO. 114-250 (2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
KOPPEL, supra note 50, at 24.
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likely related to funding or political gridlock.157 If Congress is genuinely
concerned about terrorism, it should consider a response to terrorism postattack as well, which includes funding a preventive increase in the
resiliency of the grid.
As representatives of the American population, Congressmen fall into
the hysteria-induced trap of terrorism’s systematic application of panic by
focusing on the most dramatic types of attacks rather than the ones that are
likely to happen and failing to address simpler vulnerabilities.
It would be detrimental to everyone if a terrorist used nuclear, biological,
or chemical weapons to harm Americans. Nuclear terrorism, bioterrorism, and
chemical warfare, however, all have their own criminal provisions while the
vulnerable electric grid is unprotected.158 Congress’s concern over an EMP
attack is good news, but it overlooks the more simple ways a terrorist attack
could work.
Congress’s usual reaction to a terrorist attack is to fund the rebuilding
of stronger, more solid systems that could withstand the stressor that failed
the previous one, but resiliency is about more than taking preventive action.
Resiliency is “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and
withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions.”159 Developing the ability
to recover rapidly is as important as having strong preventive protections.
Our electricity infrastructure will improve with Smart Grid updates, but it
will still be vulnerable to attack. Criminal statutes are an essential part of a
response plan to a terrorist attack. Grid resiliency is an unattainable goal as
long as there is no punishment for attacking it.
IV. A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO SIMPLIFY PROSECUTION
AND PROTECT CITIZENS
The severity of a potential terrorist attack on the currently vulnerable
electric grid justifies revamping the electric grid. As helpful as the Smart
Grid sounds, it will be years before it is completely implemented throughout
the country. Legal systems should be prepared for an attack in the meantime.
The unsatisfactory legal framework to address criminal activity leaves
victims naked and afraid—allowing terrorists to be successful in their goals
of inflicting violence and fear.

157. Id.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 175 (2002); 18 U.S.C. § 229 (1998); 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(c)(2)
(2004); 18 U.S.C. § 2332i (2015).
159. What is Security and Resilience?, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
https://perma.cc/99BE-HKLZ (last updated Dec. 8, 2017).
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A. Options for a Unified International Approach
There are two solutions to the issue of impunity for alleged terrorists
under international law. First, the international legal regime has thus far
failed to create a comprehensive legal framework regarding terrorism.
Revisiting the Draft Comprehensive Convention Against International
Terrorism would be beneficial for any state hoping to establish legal
justifications for potential terrorist attacks against it. This convention should
grant criminal jurisdiction to the ICC, and—in case a state conducts a
cyberattack—jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice. While many
acts of terrorism rise to the level of crime against humanity under the Rome
Statute, the physical, cyber, and electromagnetic methods of attack on
electricity infrastructure do not fall directly under the language. Considering
that the purpose of establishing crimes against humanity is to capture the
most egregious of offenses against human beings, it is inappropriate to
include these attacks unless a long-term blackout does occur. Relief should
be created elsewhere in the law.
Second, a provision extending the Rome Statute to acts of terror with a
new clause adding a mens rea to incite terror would clarify the applicability
of those provisions. Article 8 of the Rome Statute, regarding war crimes,
does not provide consolation either; whether people can be punished for acts
of terrorism should not depend on statehood status. War crimes are either
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or violations of other laws
applicable in international armed conflict.160 If a terrorist is not a member of
a government or commits an act that does not fall into the Conventions’
common Article III non-international conflicts extension, then he cannot be
prosecuted in the ICC.
Leaders of terrorist organizations should be liable for their organized acts
of violence and lone wolf terrorists should still be culpable for their unilateral
acts. Currently under the Rome Statute, the ICC does not have jurisdiction
over terrorism as its own offense, and it is unlikely member states would
approve of the change.161 Terrorist attacks can be severe enough to match or
include some of the other crimes the court has jurisdiction over.
Adding a section to the crimes against humanity or war crimes sections
providing that any of the listed actions with the “intent to incite fear or terror”
is under the ICC’s jurisdiction would be the smallest extension of authority
possible to include terrorism in the Rome Statute. Terrorism, by definition, is
using violence to incite fear, and the acts of violence are already listed. Adding
this requisite intent specifically implicates terrorism and clarifies the
160. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 130, art. 8.
161. Beth van Schaack, Finding the Tort of Terrorism in International Law,
28 REV. LITIG. 381, 422-23 (2008).
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jurisdiction of prosecutors. This is a narrow extension of jurisdiction
compared to adding an entire category of crimes to the Rome Statute.
Out of the two solutions, ratification of the Draft Convention on Terrorism
or a similar instrument would be the preferable solution because of the unified
approach, but criminal liability under the Rome Statute would also solve the
issue of the absence of specific laws to address a terrorist attack on electricity
infrastructure. Either way, international law on the issue of terrorism is essential
because it provides a safety net for nations without terrorism laws, jurisdiction
restraints, or other reasons for inability to individually prosecute. Impunity is
unacceptable. The pooled power of nation-states in condemnation of terrorism
would have more influence in ending the phenomenon than the classic and
problematic West-East dichotomy.162
B. Proposal for a Specific and Targeted Domestic Statute
The United States justice system is vast, but it may need the
international law safety net because the criminal laws are insufficient to
prosecute terrorists to the extent that its policy condemns them. Prosecution
of terrorists is essential to incapacitate them, gather intelligence, and deter
future acts of terrorism.163
A recent study164 on prosecuting terrorism cases in federal courts came
to several conclusions. First, the criminal justice system is insufficient to
address international terrorism alone, and the government must draw on its
military, intelligence, diplomacy, economic, and law enforcement systems
as well.165 Second, terrorism cases are extremely complex and produce
strain on the criminal justice system.166 Third, the criminal justice system
is prone to many types of errors but is workable and credible in general.167
A statute covering an attack on electricity infrastructure must simplify the
complexities and challenges for the criminal justice system.
There are three main reasons passing a specific federal statute is the best
solution for protecting the electricity infrastructure. First, as of today, if a
physical or cyberattack were to take place, a prosecutor would most likely
pick the most relevant statutes on terrorism and the individual acts of harming
private property and list them all in a complaint to get the terrorist into court.
The statutes might not all be optimally targeted to address particular acts.
Procedurally, this does not hurt the prosecutor because a more accurate
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
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superseding indictment can always be filed later. This approach, however, is
an inefficient waste of government time and money.
Second, a specific statute would streamline prosecutions. Nuclear
terrorism, bioterrorism, and chemical warfare all have their own criminal
provisions;168 therefore, a separate statute criminalizing an attack on an
enumerated list of Smart Grid components would have precedent. An attack
on electricity infrastructure could be as damaging to businesses and lives as
any other type of terrorism. A more specific provision would make
prosecution simpler and clarify the actions that would violate the law.
Third, a specifically tailored statute is necessary to avoid excessive rights
infringements. Legislators should keep in mind that terrorists intend, through
their attacks, to motivate increased security measures, which restricts freedom
at home. The vicious cycle of violence followed by increased security measures
limits U.S. citizens without preventing terrorism. A statute punishing a specific
type of crime, rather than sweeping restrictions or regulations, is narrow and
will not negatively affect citizens that choose not to engage in terrorist attacks.
An ideal statute criminalizing a terrorist attack on electricity infrastructure
would include several elements. First, it must be aimed at several types of
terrorists, whether lone actors or groups.
Second, it would also criminalize attempt and conspiracy. Inchoate
liability could deter many attacks.
Third, it would have separate and detailed sections on physical attacks
and cyberattacks. The physical attacks section would criminalize property
damage as other statutes do, but broaden the methods by which it is possible.
For example, shooting a transformer with guns, bombing a power plant, or
dropping weapons on a power station via drone should all fall under the
language of the statute. The cyberattacks section would contemplate an attack
from someone inside a utility company and from a basement on the other side
of the world. It would protect the SCADA systems and each component of
the new Smart Grid system so that the statute does not become outdated as the
grid updates. In both the physical and cyberattacks sections, each component
of the grid should be covered. The statute should be written to protect both the
current electrical grid and the anticipated technologies of the Smart Grid.
Fourth, the statute would include a mens rea element of purpose or
knowledge. The language should include the intent to incite fear or perpetrate
violence on the grid, the industry supporting it, and the citizens using it.
Fifth, the statute would have a section on jurisdiction similar to 18
U.S.C. § 2339B(d), the material support statute, which establishes that the
United States has jurisdiction whether the offender is a U.S. national or not.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 175 (2002); 18 U.S.C. § 229 (1998); 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(c)(2)
(2004); 18 U.S.C. § 2332i (2015).
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A statute satisfying these five conditions would sufficiently protect the
electricity grid. The danger of enumerated lists of any crimes or types of
crimes is that it could be under-inclusive. To address adequately the risk
of a terrorist attack of any type, however, a framework should be laid out
ahead of time. If deterrence is truly a value of the criminal justice system,
potential defendants deserve knowledge that an act is criminalized before
they commit it. Providing a specific legal framework for terrorism
improves protection of due process rights. Terrorism is common enough
in the twenty-first century to justify a specific and targeted legal response.
With respect to criminal liability, federal government regulations will
continue to address the risk of an attack on energy infrastructure inadequately
because of the transnational quality of terrorism. Industry and the government
must work together to an extent to decide on an optimal level of information
sharing for terrorism prevention. It is good business for the electric industry
to protect itself.169 The energy sector may be more successful operating on its
own rather than working to meet federal regulations, which is why the
government should reciprocate those efforts through laws that directly punish
threats to the industry.
CONCLUSION
International and national laws should more expressly address threats to
the electricity infrastructure. Experts agree that the severity of a possible
attack is a sufficient reason to focus on improving the electricity infrastructure.
The Smart Grid is a crucial step towards improving security and a necessary
twenty-first century update to infrastructure, but care should be taken in
increased interconnectivity between grids. In the immediate future, before the
Smart Grid is completed, legal steps are necessary to deter and protect the
industry from attack. The electric industry must take steps towards updating
the Smart Grid as quickly as economically feasible, and the government must
quickly create a response plan that includes criminal liability for alleged
terrorists. Preparation for such an attack should build confidence that if
anything happens, the United States will be ready.
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